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Abstract  
This study examined the effects of ego depletion on ambiguous figure perception. Adults (N 
= 315) received an ego depletion task and were subsequently tested on their inhibitory control 
abilities that was indexed by the Stroop task (Experiment 1) and their ability to perceive both 
interpretations of ambiguous figures that was indexed by reversal (Experiment 2). Ego 
depletion had a very small effect on reducing inhibitory control (Cohen’s d = .15) 
(Experiment 1). Ego depleted participants had a tendency to take longer to respond in Stroop 
trials. In Experiment 2, ego depletion had small to medium effects on the experience of 
reversal. Ego depleted viewers tended to take longer to reverse ambiguous figures (duration 
to first reversal) when naïve of the ambiguity and experienced less reversal both when naïve 
and informed of the ambiguity. Together, findings suggest that ego depletion has small 
effects on inhibitory control and small to medium effects on bottom-up and top-down 
perceptual processes. The depletion of cognitive resources can reduce our visual perceptual 
experience.  
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Ego depletion in visual perception: Ego depleted viewers experience less ambiguous 
figure reversal 
Research over the past 100 years has used ambiguous figures, pictures with more than one 
interpretation, to examine the interplay of bottom-up and top-down processing in visual 
perception (Long & Batterman, 2012; Melcher & Wade, 2006; Ward & Scholl, 2015; 
Wimmer & Doherty, 2011). Ambiguous figures evoke different interpretations while the 
physical properties of the stimulus itself remain unchanged. This switching between 
interpretations is termed “ambiguous figure reversal” (Long & Toppino, 2004). Whilst a 
plethora of research has demonstrated the interplay of processes allowing reversal, in the 
current research we addressed how the “depletion” of cognitive resources reduces our visual 
perceptual experience.  
Evidence from different fields has demonstrated that inhibitory processes play a key 
role in the reversal experience. Developmental research has shown that inhibitory ability 
allows 4- to 5-year-old children to experience reversal per se when informed of the ambiguity 
(Wimmer & Doherty, 2011). Bilingual children who have superior inhibitory control 
(Carlson & Meltzoff, 2008) are more likely to reverse ambiguous figures than their 
monolingual peers (Bialystock & Shapero, 2005; Wimmer & Marx, 2014). In addition to 
allowing reversal, inhibitory control can also reduce reversal. Adults can voluntarily control 
the perception of one interpretation when instructed to hold their first interpretation, 
demonstrating the role of top-down processes in visual perception (Hochberg & Peterson, 
1987; Mathes, Strüber, Stadler, & Basar-Eroglu, 2006; Meng & Tong, 2004; Peterson & 
Gibson, 1991; Slotnik & Yantis, 2005; Suzuki & Peterson, 2000; van Ee, van Dam, & 
Brouwer, 2005). However, viewers cannot fully control their reversal rate as the instruction to 
hold one interpretation only leads to a decrease in reversal of between 1/2 and 1/3 over a 3 
minute period (Strüber & Stadler, 1999), highlighting the additional role of bottom-up 
processes in reversal.   
   The current research investigates the specific role of inhibitory processes in reversal 
and takes an opposite approach. If inhibitory control allows reversal per se, will the depletion 
of inhibitory processes directly interfere with reversal, thus, reduce it? To investigate the 
effect of inhibitory depletion on reversal, we use an ego depletion method from Social 
Psychology. Ego depletion refers to “a temporary reduction in the self’s capacity or 
willingness to engage in volitional action, (including controlling the environment, controlling 
the self, making choices, and initiating action) caused by prior exercise of volition” 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998, pp. 1253). The underlying principle of ego 
depletion is that performance on a task requiring self-control will subsequently lead to a 
decrease in performance in an unrelated self-control task (Alós-Ferrer, Hügelschäfer, & Li, 
2015; Baumeister, et al., 1998; Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010). Specifically, 
participants who cross off some instances of the letter “e” following complex rules watch a 
boring movie longer when it requires active quitting (pressing a button) than passive quitting 
(removing the hand from a button) (Baumeister et al., 1998). Thus, participants’ self-control 
is impaired after monitoring behaviour and overriding a habitual response such as crossing 
off all instances of the letter “e” (Baumeister et al., 1998).   
The ego depletion effect is demonstrated widely across a range of tasks but the 
underlying mechanisms are not well understood.  Ego depletion may reflect a low-level 
bottom-up process (Baumeister et al., 1998) or a high-level top-down process (Inzlicht, 
Schmeichel, & Macrae, 2014). The energy model (Baumeister et al., 1998) purports that self-
control is a limited resource. In a self-control task energy is consumed and subsequent task 
performance requiring self-control will be reduced due to limited energy and its conservation, 
analogous to a tired muscle (Baumeister, 2014). For example, self-control is linked to blood 
glucose levels and consuming a glucose drink reduces the ego depletion effect (Galliot et al., 
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2007). In contrast, self-control requirements may subsequently lead to reduced attention to 
cues that require control and reduced motivation to exert control (Inzlicht, et al., 2014). For 
example, the ego depletion effect is reduced when participants are motivated to perform a 
task such as thinking that their participation helps finding Alzheimer’s disease treatments 
(Muraven & Slessareva, 2002). The energy model can account for these findings too; 
motivation reduces the ego depletion effect because ego depleted participants can still exert 
conserved self-control if motivated beforehand (Baumeister, 2014). Overall, it is unclear what 
processes underlie ego depletion per se. However, given that ego depletion affects bottom-up 
processes (Baumeister, 2014) and top-down processes (Inzlicht et al., 2014), it should reduce 
ambiguous figure reversal involving both processes.     
To test whether the depletion of inhibitory control leads to reduced reversal we 
adapted the well-established ego depletion task (Baumeister et al., 1998) and measured the 
effect on inhibitory control, indexed by the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) (Experiment 1) and 
reversal (Experiment 2). Specifically, it was examined whether ego depletion affects reversal 
when being naïve of the ambiguity (bottom-up) versus being informed of both interpretations 
(top-down). If ego depletion reflects a low-level process (Baumeister et al., 1998) then this 
should lead to reduced reversal under naïve conditions whereas if it reflects a high-level 
process (Inzlicht et al., 2014) then this should reduce reversal under informed conditions.  
Experiment 1: Establishing ego depletion effects on inhibitory control 
Here, the effects of ego depletion on inhibitory control were examined. Participants were 
either ego depleted using a well-established ego depletion task (Baumeister et al., 1998) or 
not depleted and then subsequently given the Stroop task, indexing inhibitory control.    
Method 
Participants 
Overall 214 adults (165 females) (M = 22 years, SD = 7 years) recruited via the 
Plymouth University online participation system participated. They either received course 
credit or financial reimbursement.  
Design 
Half of the participants received an ego depletion task (N = 113) and the other half an 
analogous control task (N = 101).  After that, all participants received a computerized Stroop 
task. The experiment lasted around 30 minutes. 
Materials and Procedure 
Participants in the control condition received a typewritten sheet of paper containing 
technical text (a page from a neuroscience article) and were instructed to cross off all 
instances of the letter “e”.  Participants in the ego depletion condition were additionally told 
to only cross off an “e” if it is “not adjacent to another vowel and more than one letter away 
from another vowel” (thus, one would not cross off the “e” in “pear” or  “vowel”) 
(Baumeister et al., 1998). Eight example words were provided clarifying the instructions.   
After that all participants received a computerized version of the Stroop task on a 
standard PC (1920 x 1080 resolution), containing 100 word reading-, 100 colour naming-, 
and 100 interference trials. Each trial type was preceded by 10 practise trials. Trial type order 
was counterbalanced between participants. Stimuli comprised color words (red, green, blue, 
yellow) written in red, green, blue, yellow, or black font. Color words were aligned in a 2 by 
2 square configuration in the centre of the screen centred by a fixation cross where the mouse 
was positioned at the start of each trial. The target stimulus appeared below the square 
configuration and was displayed until participants gave a response via mouse click, followed 
by the next trial 1000 ms apart. In word reading trials, the target was a color word in black 
font and participants clicked on the according color patch (e.g., “if the word “BLUE” 
appears, click on the blue color patch”). In color naming trials, the target was a color patch 
and participants clicked on the according word (e.g., “if you see a BLUE patch, click on the 
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word “Blue”), In interference trials, the target was a color word and participants clicked on 
the color the word is written in (e.g., “if you see the word BLUE written in red, click on the 
word “Red”). In interference trials the color word was incongruent with the color the word 
was written in in most trials (76 trials) mixed with 24 congruent trials to increase the 
interference effect.  
Results and Discussion Experiment 1 
Accuracy on percentage of Stroop trials was at ceiling (ego depleted: M = 98.34; 
control: M = 97.89) and therefore no statistical analysis was conducted. Eight participants (3 
ego depleted and 5 controls) failed all interference trials and were excluded from analyses. 
The final analyses include participants who followed the ego depletion instructions, that is, 
both rules (N = 82) and control instructions (N = 95).  
We analysed mean response time in the Stroop task using bootstrap resampling to 
obtain effect sizes. There was barely a response time difference on overall Stroop response 
time between ego depleted participants (M = 1001 ms) and controls (M = 985ms), Cohen’s d 
= .095.   
However, it was of theoretical interest whether ego depletion would reduce inhibitory 
control rather than all-across-the-board response time. To isolate the inhibitory component, 
for each participant, the average of their response time in the two control conditions (word 
reading and colour naming) was subtracted from their mean response time in interference 
trials. In this inhibitory mean response time measure, ego depleted participants (M = 233 ms) 
had a tendency to take longer to respond than control participants (M = 207 ms) Cohen’s d = 
0.15.  The same findings were obtained when response time in colour naming was used as 
comparison against the interference trials (interference latency – colour naming latency); ego 
depleted (M = 234 ms) versus controls (M = 205 ms), Cohen’s d = .18.  
 Thus, there is a small effect of ego depletion reducing inhibitory control. These 
findings do not support previous research revealing large ego depletion effects on inhibitory 
control (Johns et al., 2008). Can this small effect be a result of procedural differences of our 
Stroop version such as responding via mouse click or implementing the traditional blocked 
trial version as opposed to the more recently used item-by-item version? This seems unlikely 
as if anything the blocked version reveals larger inhibitory control effects than the item-by-
item version (Ludwig, Borella, Tettamanti, & de Ribaupierre, 2010; Salo, Henik, & 
Robertson, 2001). Thus, we would have expected to find at least equally large ego depletion 
effects on Stroop performance in a blocked version as in Johns et al.’s (2008) item-by-item 
version. Moreover, the Stroop effect is demonstrated widely across different response 
modalities (e.g., oral versus pressing a keyboard button versus typing in the word). At which 
stage of the task the Stroop effect emerges, is subject to debate (during encoding or response 
selection) but evidence rules out that the Stroop effect occurs at response execution (Damian 
& Freeman, 2007; Gordon & Zbrodoff, 1998). Therefore, it is unlikely that procedural 
differences in the Stroop version can explain the differences in the magnitude of the ego 
depletion effect in our study (d = .15) and in Johns et al. (2008) (d = .76).       
Experiment 2: The effects of ego depletion on ambiguous figure reversal 
Having established a small reduction of inhibitory control with the current ego depletion task, 
it was examined whether ego depletion reduces reversal (duration to first reversal and number 
of reversals) when naïve versus informed of ambiguity.  
Method 
Participants 
Overall 101 adults (69 females) (M = 24 years, SD = 11 years) recruited via the 
Plymouth University online participation system took part and either received course credit or 
financial reimbursement.  
Design 
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First, participants received the same ego depletion (N = 51) or control task (N = 50) as 
in Experiment 1 followed by the ambiguous figure (AF) reversal task.  
Materials and Procedure 
The ego depletion task was the same as in Experiment 1. The AF reversal task was 
computerized and ran on a standard PC (1920 x 1080 resolution) in Visual Basic. 
Ambiguous figure (AF) reversal task. The ambiguous duck/rabbit (11 x 7.5cm) 
(Jastrow, 1900), man/mouse (8.5 x7.5cm) (Bugelski & Alampay, 1961), mother/face (9 x 
10.5 cm) (Fisher, 1967), and cowboy/Indian (10 x 11.5cm) (Botwinick, 1961) were used ( 
Figure 1). Participants sat approximately 1m from the screen. 
Before presenting the ambiguous figures, participants received two familiarization 
trials each lasting 60 seconds. In one trial the image changed physically (a horse morphed 
into a sheep) whereas in the other no change occurred as the figure was unambiguous (a line 
drawing of a girl). Participants pressed the space bar whenever they thought that the image 
changed. The purpose of familiarization was to introduce the concept of change without the 
concept of ambiguity and to control for false positives (people reporting changes without 
perceiving them) and false negatives (people perceiving changes without reporting them). 
Two participants were identified as false positives and their data were removed from further 
analyses.  
After familiarization, in the naïve phase participants were presented with the first 
ambiguous figure and uninformed of the ambiguity and alternative interpretations. 
Participants were asked what they saw (initial interpretation) (e.g., “a duck”). Then, they 
indicated their perceptual changes via button press over 60 seconds. The program recorded 
the dependent variables, i) when the first reversal occurred (duration to first reversal) and ii) 
how often reversal occurred (reversal rate). This was repeated with the remaining 3 
ambiguous figures (man/mouse, cowboy/Indian, face/mother). Ambiguous figures appeared 
in random order counterbalanced between participants. If participants reversed, then at the 
end of the naive phase, they were asked what the alternative perceived interpretation was, 
ensuring perception of the alternative interpretation as indicated. Alternative labels were 
accepted as long as the participant was able to indicate relevant features of his/her stated 
changed interpretation (e.g., old woman instead of Indian, or woman instead of mother with 
baby, or man instead of face).  
Then, the informed phase followed the same procedure, except that first, each figure 
was disambiguated by adding disambiguating context drawings for each interpretation and 
each interpretation was labelled (e.g., “This could be a duck, this could be a rabbit.” “You 
will now be shown the ambiguous image for 60 seconds. Please press the space bar each time 
you see the image flip between pictures”).  
At the end, participants were asked whether they had seen any ambiguous figure 
before.  
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Figure 1. AFs used in Experiment 2 (clockwise from top-left: duck/rabbit, cowboy/Indian, 
face/mother, man/mouse).  
 
Results and Discussion Experiment 2 
 Data of 5 outliers (2 standard deviations above the mean) in the number of reversals 
experienced in the naïve phase were removed from any further analysis.   
 Prior knowledge of ambiguous figures 
Depending on the type of ambiguous figure, there were considerable differences in whether it 
had been seen before, Friedman-test, χ2(3, 94) = 73.9, p < .001. Specifically, the duck/rabbit 
was more known (all z > 5.06, ps < .001) (by 45% of participants) than any other figure 
which did not differ (all ps > .05) (Wilcoxon Signed Ranks) except that the cowboy-Indian 
was more known than the man-mouse (p = .04) (face-woman: 7%, cowboy-Indian: 11%, 
man-mouse: 4%). Thus, because of high familiarity with the duck-rabbit figure to compare 
naïve and informed phases, this figure was removed from any further analyses.  
 Ambiguous figure reversal 
We analysed mean time in seconds to first reversal (duration to first reversal) and mean 
number of reversals (reversal rate), using bootstrap resampling to obtain confidence intervals 
on both the mean values and the effect sizes. Figure 2 shows the means.  
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Figure 2. Time to first reversal and number of reversals for Ego depleted and Control 
participants, when naive and informed about ambiguous figures. Error bars are 95% CI. 
 
The effect of being informed about ambiguity is clear, with a marked decrease in time to first 
reversal and a large increase in the total number of reversals reported. There is a tendency for 
ego depleted participants to take longer to report a reversal, and see fewer in total. Figure 3 
shows the effect size of the differences between groups in each condition. 
 
Figure 3. Cohen d effect size for the difference between Ego depleted and Control 
participants; sign-reversed for number of reversals. Error bars are 95% CI. 
 
The estimate of effect size for time to first reversal is 0.42 in the naïve condition, falling to 
0.08 in the informed condition. For number of reversals, the effect size increases from 0.26 
when naïve to 0.35 when informed (the direction of the difference is opposite, as shown in 
Figure 2; reversing the sign of Cohen’s d makes Figure 3 clearer. We cannot confidently rule 
out an effect size of zero in any condition, due to large individual differences between 
participants. However, the pattern seems clear: while the tendency of ego depleted 
participants to take longer to see a reversal disappears when they are informed of the 
ambiguity, they still make fewer reversals overall.   
This pattern is consistent with reduced bottom-up processing in ego depleted 
participants. After ego depletion it takes longer to reverse when uninformed of ambiguity 
(bottom-up), which disappears when informed (top-down).  The addition of this top-down 
information greatly increases the number of reversals seen, but has much the same effect on 
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both control and ego depleted participants, suggesting both are equally sensitive to top-down 
processing. Ego depleted participants persist in seeing fewer reversal when informed, 
consistent with reduced bottom-up processing. 
General Discussion 
The current aim was to examine whether the depletion of inhibitory control reduces the 
experience of reversal. Adapting an ego depletion paradigm from Social Psychology 
(Baumeister et al., 1998), inhibitory control was slightly reduced after ego depletion 
(Experiment 1) but it is important to stress that the effect is small. In Experiment 2, when ego 
depleted adults viewed ambiguous figures, they were less likely to reverse ambiguous figures. 
Thus, in addition to findings demonstrating that inhibitory control allows or stabilises 
reversal (e.g., Wimmer & Doherty, 2011, Strüber & Stadler, 1999) the current findings reveal 
that the depletion of inhibitory resources may reduce reversal. Reversal reduction occurred 
when both being naïve and informed of ambiguity, suggesting ego depletion effects on both 
bottom-up and top-down processes.  
It is unclear what mechanisms underlie ego depletion and there is debate whether ego 
depletion reflects the depletion of low-level processes (Baumeister et al., 1998) or reduces 
active motivation and attention to reach a goal or perform a task (Inzlicht et al., 2014). The 
current findings cannot directly answer this debate and the reduction in reversal rate when 
informed of ambiguity can be a result of both neural fatigue effects (bottom-up) and lack of 
motivation to focus on the task (top-down). However, the additional finding that ego 
depletion increased response time to reverse initially when naïve about the ambiguity is in 
line with the suggestion that ego depletion particularly reduces bottom-up processing 
(Baumeister et al., 1998) rather than solely affecting top-down processing (Inzlicht et al., 
2014). Thus, overall, a hybrid model of ego depletion involving both bottom-up and top-
down processes seems more plausible.  
However, the size of the ego depletion effect has recently been put into question in a 
pre-registered replication study involving 23 laboratories (Hagger & Chatzisarantis, 2016). 
Effect sizes on response time differences between ego depleted and control participants 
ranged between Cohen’s d = -.06 and .36 with 95% confidence interval. Moreover, task 
performance varied greatly in accuracy both between ego depleted and control participants 
and across different laboratories (15%-44% of participants performing < 80% correct) 
(Hagger & Chatzisarantis, 2016). Clearly, this raises the issue of the strength of the ego 
depletion effect and how minor procedural differences across laboratories, different 
populations, and variation in task performance affect the overall strength of the effect 
(Baumeister & Vohs, 2016). Our single lab findings reveal a small ego depletion effect and 
do not support previous results showing strong effects of ego depletion on inhibitory Stroop 
performance (Johns et al., 2008). Power analysis (Gpower, Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 
2007) suggests that we had sufficient power (174 participants needed) to detect large sized 
effects at d = .5. In Experiment 2 the ego depletion effect was larger, demonstrating novel 
effects in visual perception. Thus, the current research supports demonstrations of the effect 
across a wide domain of tasks (Hagger et al., 2010), but raises the question of the size of the 
effect. 
Furthermore, findings from the ego depletion literature are at odds with the traditional 
cognitive literature on sequential modulation effects. When a task poses response conflict 
then inhibitory control performance is enhanced in a second self-control task due to activated 
cognitive control or priming (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Mayr, Awh, 
& Laurey, 2003). Specifically, responding to an incongruent Flanker task trial reduces 
response time on an immediately followed incongruent Number Stroop trial when 
participants are initially aware of trial difficulty (Fernandez-Duque & Knight, 2008). 
Crucially, the sequential modulation effect occurs on a trial by trial basis when task type 
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varies across trials as opposed to the sequential task paradigm in ego depletion. Thus, when 
the cognitive system is put under response conflict across different tasks it can enhance 
cognitive control across tasks online on a trial by trial basis (cognitive literature on sequential 
modulation) but not when the task flow is interrupted (ego depletion literature). This 
difference between online task engagement and task interruption may cause participants to 
show opposite self-control effects. Future research might want to directly investigate this 
claim.        
Overall, current findings provide novel insights into the functional dependence of 
inhibitory processes on the disambiguation of visual information under naïve and informed 
conditions. The depletion of inhibitory control may reduce our visual perceptual experience 
of reversal. 
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